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Abstract: The paper aims at systematic placement of identification 
concept within Bayesian approach. Pointing to some deficiencies of the 
standard Bayesian language to describe identification problem we propose 
several useful characterizations that seem to be intuitively sound and 
attractive given their potential applications. We offer comprehensive 
interpretations for them. Moreover we introduce the concepts of uniform, 
marginal and faithful identification. We argue that all these concepts may 
have practical significance. Our theoretical development is illustrated with a 
number of simple examples and one real application i.e. Structural VAR 
model. 
 
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Studying classical papers from early sixties (by Drèze, Rothenberg, Zellner and 
others) one has unambiguous impression that attractiveness of Bayesian inference in 
econometrics was linked to the possibility of imposing inexact (approximate) 
restrictions in the Simultaneous Equations Models (SEM) instead of exact ones. 
Hence one may say that identification problem was a fuel for the first prototypes of 
Bayesian engines in econometrics. Presently there is some ambiguity concerning the 
legitimacy of approximate restrictions introduced within Bayesian framework. 
Although Drèze (1972,1974,1976), Zellner (1971), Rothenberg (1973) seem to stand 
by this opinion, Kadane (1974) disagrees. However it appears that most Bayesians 
reached a consensus that identification is a property of the structural model 
likelihood function and probabilistic restrictions (i.e. non–degenerate prior) can not 
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be a substitute for exact restrictions that are needed to identify the sampling model1. 
Although the same position is upheld in our paper we propose (hopefully) an 
interesting view on this subject. 
We ask the same research questions as the pioneers of Bayesian econometrics 
did. Since most restrictions employed in economic modeling should be treated not as 
genuine statements but only as useful approximations, can we use in some way the 
prior which expresses our uncertainty concerning “proper” restrictions in order to 
“objectivize” or “robustify” our inference? Do we really believe that exclusion 
restrictions used in many econometric models are literally true or they rather may be 
interpreted that impact of some variable is negligible? Isn’t it rational to treat 
approximate knowledge as explicitly approximate? Is there any difference between 
identification of the sampling and Bayesian model? More fundamentally: Can 
Bayesian contribute to successful dealing with non–identified sampling model? 
Answers to these questions may interest not only the people (like the author) 
who have wrestled with them for many years but also practitioners given the recent 
resurgence of Bayesian analysis in the field of quantitative macroeconomics, where 
identification issue occupies central position, see e.g. Canova and Sala (2009).  
 
II. A CRITICAL REPORT ON BAYESIAN IDENTIFICATION STRUGGLES 
As claimed in the introduction, the problem of identification was intimately 
connected with Simultaneous Equations Models (SEM). It should not be surprising 
that early Bayesian notions of identification in the econometric literature were fitted 
into SEM. The seminal results are due to J. Drèze’s unpublished (1962) work, which 
reappear in Drèze (1972,1974,1976). Fortunately the intrinsic properties of SEM 
turned out to be characteristic of many other models in a variety of fields of science. 
Hence this framework quickly became a cornerstone for discussion of Bayesian 
identification in every model within econometric literature (see e.g. Hsiao (1983), 
Poirier (1998)) and statistics literature (see e.g. Dawid (1979), Gelfand and Sahu 
(1999), Gustafson (2005)). In a nutshell these results are as follows. Assume that the 
parameter space may be decomposed as variation free i.e. Θ = Θ , in such a way 
that the likelihood depends only on θ  i.e.  for every 
, , where y  denotes the data. If this is the case we will say that the 
×Θ1 2
2
2
                                                
∈ Θ2 θ θ θ=1 2 2( | , ) ( | )p y p y
θ ∈Θ1 1 θ ∈ Θ2
 
1 However the recent aricle by Kraay (2012) is a clear sign that the intuition of Drèze is still alive and deeply 
rooted in minds of Bayesian users. 
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likelihood is oriented. Assume we have a joint prior . Then the simple 
consequence is that the conditional prior of θ  given θ  is not updated by the data 
i.e. . However one caveat is that unless , we 
generally have . Moreover the assumption that parameter space is 
variation free is crucial. Indeed, even if  but the parameter space 
is not variation free we can have . For future reference when 
 we will say that there is the Bayesian learning. 
θ −2 θ θ1 2( , )p
1 2
θ θ θ θ=1 2 1 2( | , ) ( | )p y p θ θ θ θ=1 2 1 2( , ) ( ) ( )p p p
θ ≠1( | ) ( )p y p θ1
θ1
θ1
2
2
2
2
2
θ θ θ θ=1 2 1 2( , ) ( ) ( )p p p
θ ≠1( | ) ( )p y p
θ ≠1( | ) ( )p y p
Unfortunately the above reasoning hinges on 1) existence and 2) finding a 
variation free decomposition Θ = Θ  such that the likelihood is oriented. In 
SEM the matter was simple:  was the space of nonsingular matrices and  the 
space of reduced form parameters. Usually the basic model parameterization does not 
allow to decompose the parameter space  so as the likelihood is 
oriented. Some efforts might be needed to find such a decomposition. The more 
fundamental question is under what conditions a model possesses the 
reparameterization which results in θ oriented likelihood. To realize that it may 
not be always attainable note that Θ = Θ  means that for all θ  there is a 
bijective decomposition  for some , . What matters is the 
universal quantifier “for all”. There is no complete theory with this respect. Some 
partial (but quite general) results are given in Oulhaj and Mouchart (2003) and 
implicitly in Kocięcki (2011). As a matter of fact it is not unusual in practice that the 
most natural or sensible parameterization of a model precludes existence of the 
variation free decomposition Θ = Θ . See Koop et al. (2011) for important 
examples from DSGE literature, and Gustafson (2005,2009) and references therein for 
other ones from many branches of applied statistics. You should be also aware that 
even if the variation free decomposition exists the parameter of interest may be a 
function of the parameters comprising both  and , see Poirier (1998) p. 488–489 
for similar caution. 
×Θ1 θ −2
1Θ 2Θ
Θ = Θ ×Θ1
θ −2
−2
×Θ1 ∈ Θ
1 2( , )θ θ θ↔ 1 1θ ∈ Θ 2θ ∈ Θ
×Θ1
1Θ 2Θ
Among other treatments of the Bayesian identification we should primarily 
mention that of Kadane (1974). However his main result establishes the fact that if 
the likelihood is oriented the whole Bayesian analysis may be confined to the 
space , which is obvious form the above informal considerations. His other concept 
i.e. informativeness of experiment, which essentially compares the behavior of the 
prior to the posterior are condemned to failure for the reasons outlined above and in 
the sequel of our paper. The same is true for similar concepts used by Leamer (1978) 
pp. 191–192, i.e. identification in probability, personal and public informativeness. In 
θ −2
2Θ
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fact the relationship between prior and the posterior for given data captures no 
information about identification of a model. You may be surprised but this 
relationship is data–driven. That is if you are unlucky and you get not the “right” 
sample then the posterior may be equal to the prior even if there is no identification 
problem. Conversely, the prior may be quite distinct from the prior even if the model 
is not identified. To realize this we suggest to consult highly instructive, but 
unfortunately little known, article by Drèze and Mouchart (1990). See also Sims 
(2007). This paragraph may be summarized by saying that Bayesian learning and 
identification are different concepts with the elusive or even haphazard mutual 
relationship. Attempts such as Müller (2012) aiming at capturing Bayesian learning, 
although very welcome, do not bring us closer to understanding the Bayesian 
identification. In our opinion measuring the Bayesian learning is meaningful and free 
of some pathologies only if the sampling model is identified. Then the Bayesian 
learning may capture “informativeness” of the particular sample. This opinion is by 
no means shared among all people within economic community, see e.g. extensive 
discussion with references in Koop et al. (2011). 
Florens et al (1990) abstract treatment concentrates on the existence 
oriented likelihood, where  is minimal sufficient in the sense of Barankin 
(1960), and its consequences for the identification. 
θ −2 2θ
The concept of observational equivalence of the marginal data densities 
discussed in Zellner (1971) pp. 254–256, although pedagogically useful, does not 
introduce any positive element into Bayesian conceptualization of identification 
problem. The conception proper is also based on interplay between prior and 
posterior distributions. 
Some people (see e.g. Morales (1971), p. 20, Rothenberg (1973) p. 158) tended 
to think that there is a link between concentration of the posterior and identification 
of a model. Moreover for Drèze (1972) “classical identification theory is really 
concerned with local uniqueness of posterior modes”. Though it is known that these 
views are in general false this will be more evident after studying the present paper2. 
Indeed even uniqueness of the maximum likelihood estimator (MLE) computed with 
very large number of observations does not imply that the model is identified for all 
                                                 
2 However it is true that both Morales and Rothenberg were not fully satisfied with this conceptualization of the 
Bayesian identification. For example Rothenberg (1973), p. 159, concludes: “we shall use the word “estimable” 
rather than “identifiable” when referring to a posterior density concentrated around its mean and leave 
unanswered the question of an appropriate Bayesian definition of identification”.  
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parameter points, but only that it is identified at the MLE. However keeping 
historical perspective this suggests that the concept of Bayesian identification was not 
altogether clear even after fundamental results of Drèze (1962) were widely known 
among Bayesians (including Drèze himself!). We note in passing that the 
reminiscences of Morales’ and Rothenberg’s crude view of the Bayesian identification 
reappears in Canova and Sala (2009). Similarly for Ríos–Rull et al. (2012) the 
curvature of the likelihood has always something to do with identification (see Koop 
et al. (2011) for some discussion on this point with further relevant references). We 
are very skeptical about the sense of such a practice. In this respect see Maddala 
(1976) for devastating counterexample. 
Lastly there is one important drawback of the approach to Bayesian 
identification based on the variation free decomposition such that the likelihood is 
oriented (to be called just the decomposition), which seems to be overlooked in 
the econometric literature. If the decomposition is available many people think that 
in such a framework  captures all the non–identifiable aspects of a model. This is in 
general not true. In fact the whole reasoning based on the decomposition is silent 
about identification of the parameter . Identification of the latter is completely 
other issue. If the likelihood does not depend on  (given ) then every sensible 
identification criterion (with or without Bayesian flavor) must suggest that  is not 
identifiable. But  may be non–identified by standard non–Bayesian arguments. 
Hence there is an implicit additional demand for Bayesian verdict concerning the 
identifiability of . This suggests that the purpose of the whole Bayesian approach 
based on the decomposition is somewhat pointless. Hence contrary to the common 
view the decomposition itself is not a very useful point of departure to discuss 
identification in the Bayesian framework. 
θ −2
1θ
2θ
1θ 2θ
1θ
2θ
2θ
Leaving the above safe framework (i.e. Θ = Θ  and the likelihood is 
oriented) it is hard to find Bayesian words to discuss the identification problem. 
We think it is useful to have adequate words to do that. To this end we shall 
introduce mostly informal vocabulary to make the paper more readable. 
×Θ1 2
θ −2
 
III. IDENTIFICATION OF THE SAMPLING MODEL 
Let  denote the sample space, which is a set of all y  attainable by at 
least one structure within a model. Each structure is indexed by the parameter 
. For simplicity we assume that the data are continuous with the corresponding 
Y ∈ Y
θ ∈ Θ
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probability density function (pdf)  with respect to some measure on Y . For 
future reference  will be called interchangeably the data sampling density or 
the likelihood. A (parametric) structural model is a set M Y . 
Since  consists of the data sampling density only, we shall call it the sampling 
model.  
( | )p y θ
( | )p y θ
{ ( | ) | ,y∈ }S p y θ θ= Θ ∈
SM
We use the standard definition of identification of the sampling model in terms 
of pdf’s, see e.g. Haavelmo (1944), Rothenberg (1971). A sampling model is globally 
identified at  if and only if (ifif) θ ∈ Θ θ∀ ∈ Θ  [( ( | ) ( | )p y p yθ = θ  for all y ) ∈ Y
⇒ θ θ= ]. In algebraic terms we can rewrite it: A sampling model is globally 
identified at θ  ifif ∈ Θ { | ( | ) ( | )} {
y
p y p yθ θ θ∈ ∈ Θ = =∩ Y }θ . We can state one more 
equivalent definition of the global identification 
 
Lemma 1: A sampling model is globally identified at  ifif θ ∈ Θ θ∀ ∈ Θ ,  
[
y∃ ∈ Y
( | ) ( | )p y p yθ θ= ⇒ θ θ= ]. 
Proof: This follows by the rule of shifting and altering a quantifier, see e.g. 
Hamilton (1978) p. 84. 
 
For economical reasons we shall drop “global” and when we refer to 
identification it should be understood that we mean the global identification. 
A simple example will be useful to validate lemma 1 and algebraic definition of 
identification. Let y  have a univariate normal distribution with mean μ  and 
variance  i.e.  (hence θ ). Then 
∈ \
1 ( | ) ( ,1)p y Nμ μ≡ μ= ( | ) ( | )p y p yμ μ=  implies 
μ μ=  or 2yμ = − μ . Putting y  we get: μ= ( | ) ( | )p y p yμ = μ  implies μ μ= . 
Hence for all μ  there exists y  such that ( | ) ( | )p y p yμ μ= ⇒ μ μ= . On the other 
hand our algebraic identification condition works well too since 
{ | ( | ) ( | )
y
p y p yμ μ∈ ∈ Θ = =∩ Y μ=}μ \{ }{ } ( { ,2 }) { }y yμμ μ μ∈∩ −∩ Y  , as required. 
Finally let us define the equivalence class of the sampling model as  
 
{ | ( | ) ( |S
y
C p yθ θ θ∈= ∈ Θ =∩ Y )}p y θ       (1) 
 
IV. IDENTIFICATION OF THE BAYESIAN MODEL 
In this section we pose and answer the following question: How can we 
interpret and rewrite the standard identification condition for the sampling model 
using Bayesian paradigm? To do that we have to take into account two obvious 
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things. In Bayesian approach we augment the data sampling density with the prior. 
For simplicity we assume that the prior is absolutely continuous with respect to 
Lebesgue measure and  is a prior pdf for parameters. Hence the joint density of 
the data and parameters is defined as . Further, there is an 
implicit additional ingredient in the Bayesian approach, namely: the support of the 
prior. Let us denote it as . This leads to definition of the 
Bayesian model i.e. . 
( )p θ
( , ) ( | ) ( )p y p y pθ θ= θ
∈
{ | ( ) 0}prior pθ θΘ = ∈Θ >
{ ( , ) | , }B priorp y yθ θ= ∈ ΘM Y
Since Bayesian analysis is conditioned on the data it is natural to look for 
identification condition that involves the likelihood (i.e. a sampling data density for 
the given data). To this end we have 
 
Lemma 2: If , y∃ ∈ Y θ∀ ∈ Θ  [ ( | ) ( | )p y p yθ θ= θ⇒ = θ ] then the sampling model is 
globally identified at . θ ∈ Θ
Proof: This follows by interchanging universal and existential quantifier in 
lemma 1. 
 
Since the sufficient condition from lemma 2 involves the likelihood one may be 
tempted to think that it may constitute a good basis for Bayesian identification 
condition but it is not so. This sufficient condition requires that there exists at least 
one sample such that standard identification condition in terms of the likelihood 
holds. Finding such a sample may be difficult in practice (i.e. it may entail serious 
theoretical obstacles). Hence to securely define Bayesian notion of identification we 
should stick to the standard definition. Following identification definition for the 
sampling model as close as possible we define the equivalence class of the Bayesian 
model i.e. , as follows BCθ
 
BCθ { | ( | ) ( |y p y p yθ θ∈= ∈ Θ =∩ Y )θ  and , }priorθ θ ∈ Θ  
( , ) ( , )
( ) ( )
{ | p y p yp py
θ
θ θθ∈= ∈ Θ =∩ Y θ  and , }priorθ θ ∈ Θ  
( , ) ( , )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
{ | p y p yp y p p y py
θ θ
θ θθ∈= ∈ Θ =∩ Y  and , priorθ θ ∈ Θ }     (2) 
( | ) ( | )
( ) ( )
{ | p y p yp py
θ θ
θ θθ∈= ∈ Θ =∩ Y  and , }priorθ θ ∈ Θ  
( | ) ( | )
( ) ( )
( { | }) ( { | ( | ) ( | )})p y p y prior priorp py y p y p y
θ θ
θ θθ θ θ∈ ∈= ∈ Θ = ∩Θ ≡ ∈ Θ = ∩Θ∩ ∩Y Y θ  
 
 7
where . Note that in the above  means evaluation of 
the posterior at given ,  and y  (so  is a point–valued)
( ) ( | ) ( )
prior
p y p y p dθ θ θ
Θ
= ∫ ( | )p y,
( | )p y, 3. Analogously,  is 
the prior evaluated at given . It is useful to rewrite  in classical terms noting 
that  
( )p ,
, BCθ
priorΘ ⊆Θ
 
Definition 1A: The Bayesian model is (globally) identified at  ifif priorθ ∈ Θ priorθ∀ ∈ Θ  
[( ( | ) ( | )( ) ( )
p y p y
p p
θ θ
θ θ=  for all y )∈ Y θ θ⇒ = ]. 
 
Alternatively, using arguments from the proof of lemma 1 one may state 
 
Definition 1B: The Bayesian model is (globally) identified at  ifif priorθ ∈ Θ priorθ∀ ∈ Θ , 
 [y∃ ∈ Y ( | ) ( | )( ) ( )p y p yp pθ θθ θ= θ θ⇒ = ]. 
From (2) we have the basic relationship  
 
B S
priorC Cθ θ= ∩Θ          (3) 
 
We immediately realize that if the underlying sampling model is not identified, the 
prior defined on the whole support  (in the sense ) can not “identify” the 
Bayesian model because then we get . This happens irrespective of whether 
the prior is highly concentrated on the subset of Θ  on which the sampling model 
would be identified as the following example explains 
Θ priorΘ = Θ
S
θ
t
= Θ }
                                                
BC Cθ =
 
Example 1 (Artificial but commonly stated to explain the identification problem)4:  
1 2ty β β ε= + +          (4) 
where  is a one–dimensional endogenous variable and . Let 
, then . Evidently 
the sampling model (4) is not identified (since ). One possible way to 
identify (4) is to assume . Then , so as 
. Can we replace exact restriction  with its probabilistic 
ty : (1 1) . . .t i i dε × ∼ 2(0, )N σ
2
1 2( , , )θ β β σ += ∈ × ×\ \ \ SCθ = 21 2{ , , |g g gβ β σ+ − ∈ \
2
1 2{ , , }
SCθ β β σ≠
2 0β = 2 0 0g gβ − = − = 0g⇒ =
2
1
2
1,0,
{ , 0, }SCβ σ β σ= 2 0β =
 
i X
2
3 We follow De Finetti (1974), p. 18, and  denotes the “placename” (i.e. “something which awaits filling in”). ,
4 In fact this example is not so far from reality. Similar form of non–identification appears in the following model 
(see e.g. Prakasa Rao (1992), p. 159). Suppose  and  are independently distributed with the exponential 
density  (for  and ). Then  has density , 
where . Clearly,  and  ( g ) result in the same distribution. 
1X 2X
( ) exp{ }ip x xλ λ= − 1,2i = 0x > 1 2max{ , }Y X= ( ) exp{ }p y yλ λ= −
1λ λ λ= + 1 gλ + 2 gλ − ∈ \
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counterpart i.e. the prior  highly concentrated around , with the hope 
that the Bayesian model would be then identified? Certainly no. Suppose 
 with the marginal prior  peaked around . Then 
no matter how tightly  is concentrated around , from (3) we get 
. Hence the Bayesian model is not 
identified. What if we drastically shorten the support of the marginal prior ? 
Assume that this support is 
2( )p β 2 0β =
prior
+Θ = × × =\ \ \ Θ
}
2( )p β 2 0β =
2( )p β 2 0β =
B S S
priorC C Cθ θ θ= ∩Θ = = 21 2{ , , |g g gβ β σ+ − ∈ \
2( )p β
1 1
1000 1000( ,− ) . This implies 1 11000 10002 ( ,gβ − ∈ − ) , hence 
2 1 1
1000 10001 2 2{ , , | ( ,
BC g g gθ β β σ β= + − − ∈ − )}. Let us check the identification of the 
Bayesian model at ( ): 21, 0,β σ 2
1
2 1 1
1000 10001,0,
{ , 0 , | 0 ( , )}BC g g gβ σ β σ= + − − ∈ − =  
2 1 1
1000 10001{ , , | ( , )} { ,0,g g gβ σ β= + ∈ − ≠ 21 }σ
Θ
y y
2
. Hence the Bayesian model is still non–
identified. To see the problem from other perspective assume  and . 
Then each equivalence class  is a downward sloping  straight line through 
 in . You can introduce the prior for all  in , but the data can 
only tell you on which line  lies. Everything else is a product of your 
imagination which is out of control by the design of the model. Thus part of your 
prior is intrinsically personal that can not be “objectivized” by the data. For example 
using the prior , where  and , 
the Bayesian learning takes place so as  and  (see e.g. 
Poirier (1998)), but this is because both  and  are functions of the identified 
“parameter”  and the non–identified one i.e. , . 
Evidently the value of measuring Bayesian learning in such a case is limited since e.g. 
transforming  into  encompasses both the impact of something that can 
be subject to scientific cognition i.e. ψ , and something metaphysical i.e. . The 
lesson is that commonly shared intuition that “soft” probabilistic restrictions in the 
Bayesian model may be a substitute for the exact restrictions in the sampling model 
is plainly false. 
2 1σ = priorΘ =
1 2,
SCβ β 45°
1 2( , )β β 2\ 1 2( , )β β 2\
1 2( , )β β
1 2 1 2( , ) ( ) ( )p p pβ β β β= 21( ) : (0, )p Nβ τ= 22( ) : (0, )p Nβ ω=
1 1( ) ( | )p pβ β≠ 2 2( ) ( | )p pβ β≠
1β 2β
1ψ β β= + 1 2β ψ β= − 2 1β ψ β= −
1( )p β 1( | )p yβ
2β
 
On the other hand if the sampling model is identified at some  then, 
provided that , the Bayesian model will be also identified at θ  by (2): 
θ ∈ Θ
priorθ ∈ Θ
 
Lemma 3: Let . Then identification of the sampling model at  implies 
identification of the Bayesian model at . 
priorθ ∈ Θ θ
θ
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The converse of lemma 3 does not necessarily hold. In example 1 even radical 
restriction of the prior support (but not degenerated one) would not make the 
Bayesian model identified. However when  than in some circumstances the 
Bayesian model may be identified even if the sampling model is not identified. The 
simplest example is when Θ = ,  with  (i.e. non–identification of 
the sampling model) and  which results in  (i.e. 
identification of the Bayesian model). Clearly what makes this simple example work 
is the support of the prior and not the shape of the prior. If  then 
identification of the Bayesian model implies identification of the sampling model. 
priorΘ ≠ Θ
Θ
Θ
\ { , }SCθ θ θ= − 0θ >
(0, )priorΘ = ∞ B SC Cθ θ= ∩ (0, ) { }θ∞ =
priorΘ =
Although (2) seems trivial, to the best of our knowledge, it did not appear in 
the literature. In fact (2) addresses successfully several cumbersome issues in 
Bayesian identification about which there arose much misunderstanding. To prepare 
the ground note that since  we can write priorΘ ⊆
( | ) ( | )
( ) ( )
{ | p y p yB prior p pyC
θ θ
θ θ θθ∈= ∈ Θ =∩ Y }
θ
. 
First consider the case when the likelihood does not depend on θ . Then 
 and we have ( | ) ( )p y pθ = { | 1 1}B prior prioryCθ θ∈= ∈ Θ = = Θ∩ Y . Hence the 
equivalence class for each  is the whole support of the prior and we get the 
most severe form of non–identification. This happens irrespective of whether we use 
flat or highly peaked prior . This is consistent with intuitive minimal 
requirements concerning “good” Bayesian definition of identification. 
priorθ ∈ Θ
( )p θ
Second consider the flat prior in the sense ( ) ( )p pθ = θ  for all , priorθ θ ∈ Θ  (of 
course we assume that  for all ). In such a case ( ) ( | )
prior
p y p y dθ θ
Θ
= <∫ ∞ y ∈ Y
{ | ( | ) ( |B prioryC p yθ θ θ θ∈= ∈ Θ =∩ Y )}p y . There are two points worth emphasizing. 
First of all it is not the degree of the posterior concentration that matters but 
whether and how posterior shape and/or location changes when we get different 
samples. To illustrate it consider the univariate case e.g. Θ = . For global 
identification at θ  it is necessary and sufficient that for one sample  we have 
\
1y ∈ Y
1( | ) ( | 1p y pθ = )yθ  at some single θ ≠ θ  (this will be the case e.g. when the posterior 
pdf is bell–shaped) and for other sample  we have 2y ∈ Y 2 2( | ) ( | )p y p yθ θ=  where 
θ θ≠ . Then  i.e. identification of the Bayesian model at . Now consider 
the general parameter space . If there is some y  such that the posterior 
 (under the flat prior) will be uniquely maximized at given 
{ }BCθ θ= θ
Θ ∈ Y
( | )p yθ θ θ=  then the 
Bayesian model will be identified at θ . It means that uniqueness of the mode in the 
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posterior under the flat prior is sufficient for identification of the Bayesian model at 
the mode. In general, adopting any prior the analogous result seems to be hard to 
establish. That is whether uniqueness of the mode in the posterior under any prior is 
sufficient for identification of the Bayesian model at the mode is an open question (at 
least for the author). All we can say is  
 
Lemma 4: Define ( | )( )argmax
prior
p y
p
θ
θθ
θ∗
∈Θ
= . Uniqueness of θ  implies that the Bayesian 
model is identified at . 
∗
θ∗
Proof: Let θ  be obtained with given data y . By definition the Bayesian 
model is identified at θ  ifif 
∗ ∗ ∈ Y
∗ ( | ) ( | )
( ) ( )
{ | }p y p yB prior p pyC
θ θ
θ θ θθ θ
∗
∗ ∗
∗
∈= ∈ Θ = =∩ Y { } . But 
{ }( | ) ( | ) ( | ) ( | )( ) ( )( ) ( )\{ }{ | } { |p y p y p y p yB prior priorp pp py yC θ θ θ θθ θ θθ θθ θ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗∗ ∗ ∗∗∈= ∈ Θ = ∩ ∈ Θ =∩ Y   } . If θ  is unique 
then 
∗
( | ) ( | )
( ) ( )
{ | } { }θ∗=p y p yprior p pθ θθ θθ
∗ ∗ ∗
∗∈ Θ =  hence  (i.e. the Bayesian model is 
identified at θ ). 
{ }BCθ θ∗ ∗=
∗
 
 Now consider the general case (any prior ). In a common opinion when 
the prior is not much updated so as the posterior  looks like the prior  
this points to some identification problems
( )p θ
( | )p yθ ( )p θ
5. According to our definition of the 
Bayesian model identification the similarity (or non–similarity)  with  
conveys no message. The important thing is whether the alternative (hypothetical) 
samples would revise the prior or not. That is we may have 
( | )p yθ ( )p θ
1( | )
( ) 1
p y
p
θ
θ =  for given 
 and all θ  but attain identification at some point 1y ∈ Y ∈ Θ θ ∈ Θ  because 
alternative samples would change the shape and/or the location of the posterior so as 
{ }BCθ θ= . This is a formal justification for insights in Drèze and Mouchart (1990). 
Although the next lemma evidently resembles theorem 4 in Rothenberg (1971) 
its new feature is that it explicitly takes into account the fact that we apply Bayesian 
inference. It says that whatever prior you choose, the moments of the sampling 
density are globally identified (trivial as it may sound it was not formally 
demonstrated). 
 
Lemma 5: Let  be any function of the data. Then :f → \Y , priorθ θ∀ ∈ Θ  
[( ( | ) ( | )( ) ( )
p y p y
p p
θ θ
θ θ=  for all y )∈ Y ( ( )) ( ( ))E f y E f yθ θ⇒ = ]. 
                                                 
5 This is in general false for well known reasons, see section II. However the discussion to follow is relevant even if 
we take these facts into account. 
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Proof: ( | ) ( | )( ) ( )
p y p y
p p
θ θ
θ θ=  for all y  implies ∈ Y ( | ) ( | )( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )p y p yp pf y p y dy f y p y dyθ θθ θ=∫ ∫Y Y  
 ⇔ ( ) ( | ) ( ) ( | )f y p y dy f y p y dyθ θ=∫ ∫Y Y . 
 
V. FURTHER CONSIDERATIONS OF THE BAYESIAN IDENTIFICATION 
Using proposition 1 in Kocięcki (2011) it can be shown that 
 
( | ) ( | ) ( | ) ( | )
( ) ( )( ) ( )
{ | } { | ( ) (p y p y p y p yB prior priorp pp py yC f
θ θ θ θ
θ θ θθ θθ θ∈ ∈= ∈ Θ = = ∈ Θ =∩ ∩Y Y )}f  (5) 
 
where  is any bijective function. In particular putting  we get f lnf ≡
 
( | ) ( | )
( ) ( )
{ | ln( ) ln( )}p y p yB prior p pyC
θ θ
θ θ θθ∈= ∈ Θ =∩ Y   
( | ) ( | )
( ) ( )
{ | ln( ) ln(p y p yprior p p
θ
θ θθ= ∈Θ = )θ  for all y } ∈ Y
( | ) ( | )
( ) ( )
{ | ln( ) ( ) ln( ) ( ) }p y p yprior p pp y dy p y dy
θ θ
θ θθ⊆ ∈ Θ =∫ ∫Y Y      (6) 
 
where . On the other hand we also have: ( ) ( | ) ( )
prior
p y p y p dθ θ θ
Θ
= ∫
 
{ | ln ( | ) ln ( | )}B prioryC p yθ θ θ∈= ∈ Θ =∩ Y p y θ       (7) 
{ | ln( ( | )) ( | ) ln( ( | )) ( | ) }prior p y p y dy p y p y dyθ θ θ θ⊆ ∈ Θ =∫ ∫Y Y θ =  
( | )
( | )
{ | ln( ) ( | )p yprior p y p y dy
θ
θθ θ= ∈ Θ =∫Y 0}  
 
Hence (6) and (7) allow for the following statements: 
 
1) A Bayesian model is not identified at  ifif θ priorθ∃ ∈ Θ  [θ θ≠  and 
( | ) ( | )
( ) ( )
ln( ) ln( )p y p yp p
θ
θ θ= θ  for all y ]. ∈ Y
 
2) If priorθ∀ ∈ Θ  [ ( | ) ( | )( ) ( )ln( ) ( ) ln( ) ( )p y p yp pp y dy p y dyθ θθ θ=∫ ∫Y Y θ θ⇒ = ] then the 
Bayesian model is identified at . θ
 
3) If priorθ∀ ∈ Θ  [ ( | ) ( )( | ) ( )ln( ) ( | ) ln( )p y pp y pp y dyθ θθθ θ =Y∫ θ θ⇒ = ] then the Bayesian 
model is identified at . θ
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4) If priorθ∀ ∈ Θ  [ ( | )( | )ln( ) ( | ) 0p yp y p y dyθθ θ =∫Y θ θ⇒ = ] then the Bayesian model 
is identified at θ . 
 
We shall interpret these statements. To this end we use concepts developed by Good 
(1960,1966) and from standard information theory. 
 Good (1960), introducing axioms based on K. Popper’s desiderata, proved that 
the only possible notion of “explanatory power” of  with respect to θ  is a 
monotonic function of 
y
( | )
( )
p y
p
θ
θ  (where both θ  and y  refer to single values). The latter 
was also called by Good the amount of information concerning θ  provided by . 
Indeed, Good (1966) argued i.e. proved introducing some axioms, that the amount of 
information must be a monotonic function of 
y
( | )
( )
p y
θp
θ . Thus according to Good, ( | )( )ln( )
p y
p
θ
θ  
is valid both for measuring “explanatory power” and amount of information. In light 
of these facts condition 1) is interpreted: the Bayesian model is not identified at θ  ifif 
whatever sample y  you may get there exists at least one θ ≠ θ  such that this sample 
will have the same explanatory power with respect to θ  and . Hence in all 
circumstances the data can not tell us whether θ  or 
θ
θ  is better explained by the 
observables. On the other hand, we may also say that amount of information for θ  
and θ  provided by (any) y  is the same. Hence the information from the data 
provide no evidence in order to differentiate between two hypotheses θ  and θ . Of 
course ( | )( )ln( )
p y
p
θ
θ  averaged with respect to , may be called 1) the prior amount of 
information concerning θ  provided by potential sample from the given model or 2) 
potential explanatory power of the data with respect to θ . 
( )p y
To get further insight into the condition 2) we make use of some concepts from 
information theory. In particular note that ( | )( )ln( )
p y
p
θ
θ  for the given y  is a gain in 
information about  provided by y . Putting it other way, since θ
( | )
( )ln( ) ln ( ) ( ln ( | ))
p y
p p p
θ
θ θ θ=− − − y , this measures a reduction in uncertainty about θ  
that results from learning about the data y . Moreover since ( | ) ( | )( ) ( )ln( ) ln( )
p y p y
p p
θ θ
θ = y  the 
latter quantifies the predictability of y  given that we know  or simply usefulness of 
knowing  for predicting y . Given this, condition 2) may be easily reinterpreted 
(which is omitted).  
θ
θ
Condition 4) is just corollary in Bowden (1973) where detailed discussion of its 
relationship with local and global identification may be found. Note however that 
sufficient condition 4) relates to the Bayesian model (not the sampling model as in 
Bowden (1973)). 
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VI. UNIFORM AND MARGINAL IDENTIFICATION 
 In this section we define a concept of the uniform identification in the 
sampling model. Further, exploiting the merits of the Bayesian approach we study 
(with the help of many examples) the marginal identifiability of the Bayesian model. 
In particular we demonstrate usefulness of the Bayesian approach in exploring the 
identification problem. We begin with the motivating considerations on the basis of 
 
Example 1 (cont.): Evidently  is (globally) identified. Moreover imposing 
one restriction  or  we can uniquely retrieve  or , respectively. 
The problem arises when both  and  have economic interpretation. Though 
excluding restrictions are used frequently they usually may be treated not as genuine 
statements but only as useful approximations. For example we may put  as 
before, but what this truly expresses is that  is almost negligible. In such a case we 
may put, say any 
1ψ β β= + 2
1 21β β∗= 2β β∗= 2β 1β
1β 2β
2 0β =
2β
1 1
1000 10002 ( ,β ∈ − ) , without disturbing the economic content of a 
model. So far it sounds like the classic motivation for imposing probabilistic 
restrictions instead of exact ones i.e. to introduce a prior distribution and apply 
Bayesian inference. As we explained this strategy falls short. The slight (but 
important) difference is that fixing , where 2 kβ = 1 11000 1000( ,k ∈ − ), is not the same as 
adopting the prior distribution for  with the support on 2β 1 11000 1000( ,− )
}σ
2
1
 and running 
the usual Bayesian procedure. In the latter case the identification of  is lost, 
whereas in the former case  is identified both in the sampling and the Bayesian 
model. Indeed in such a case  and by 
lemma 3 this equals to . Note that  for all k  i.e. 
uniformly. 
1β
1β
2
1, ,
S
k
Cβ σ = 2 21 1{ , , | } { , ,g k g k g k kβ σ β+ − − = =
2
1, ,
B
k
Cβ σ 21
2
1, ,
{ , , }S
k
C kβ σ β σ= ∈ \
 
The above example leads to the formulation of the following concept. Assume 
that the parameter space may be decomposed , where  comprise 
parameters that are subject to restrictions (in order to identify the sampling model), 
but the likelihood need not be θ oriented or oriented. For the ease of 
exposition we assume that we just fix elements of  at some value k i.e. . 
1Θ = Θ ×Θ 2Θ
−2 1θ −
2θ 2 2kθ = ∈Θ
 
Definition 2: A sampling model is uniformly identified at  ifif , 1θ ∈ Θ 2k∀ ∈ Θ
1 1θ∀ ∈ Θ  [( 1 2 1 2( | , ) ( | , )p y k p y kθ θ θ θ= = =  for all y )∈ Y 1 1θ θ⇒ = ]. 
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The uniform identifiability is the strongest possible condition for identification of  
when we restrict the remaining parameters  i.e.  will be identified no matter 
what  we choose. Needless to say, it is the most preferable situation. However 
the uniform identifiability may not be present. In general we can think of the cases 
when 1) identifiability holds for almost all  and 2) identifiability holds for one 
particular . Of course the case 1) is much more common but we may also face 
the case 2) as the following example of great practical importance illustrates 
1θ
2θ 1θ
2k ∈ Θ
2k ∈ Θ
2k ∈ Θ
 
Example 2 (identifiability holds for one particular ): 2k ∈ Θ
We consider the bivariate Structural VAR (SVAR) model 
0 1 1 2 2t t t p t pA y c Ay Ay A y ε− − −= + + + + +" t
1 2)×
A
k
}O O
;  . 1, ,t T= …
where ,  nonsingular, ,  and 
. As is well known, the model as it stands is not identified since 
, where  denotes the 
space of (2  orthogonal matrices. Equally known is that putting one off–diagonal 
element in  to zero, say , and imposing normalization ,  will 
identify SVAR model. The restriction  means that  does not respond 
instantaneously to changes in . This may not be literally true. Instead  
would be rather a synonym for “instantaneous response of  to changes in  is 
probably negligible”. In such a case we may be also interested in examining 
robustness of some other conclusions based on SVAR (i.e. Impulse Response 
Functions) to the restriction . Specifically we may e.g. impose restriction 
, where  or even k , and trace its effects on many inferential 
objects from SVAR (i.e. variance decompositions, Impulse Response Functions, etc.). 
Actually exactly such a methodology was applied to testing long–run money–output 
neutrality in the bivariate SVAR by King and Watson (1997). The problem with this 
methodology is that when we replace excluding restriction  with  
the SVAR is no longer identified under the normalization , . To show 
this note that in the case the restrictions are confined to  only we get 
. Let 
1, 2 1
2,
t
t t
y
y y
×⎡ ⎤= ∈⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ \
11 12 2 2
0 21 22
a a
A a a
×⎡ ⎤= ∈⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ \ : (2 2)iA ×
2 1c ×∈ \
1 2| , (0 , It ty Nε − …∼
0 1, , ,..., 0 1 2 0 1
{ , , ,..., | } { , , ,..., }
p
S
A c A A p pC gA gc gA gA g O A c A= ∈ ≠ 2O
2)×
0A 12 0a = 11 0a > 22 0a >
12 0a = 1,ty
2,ty 12 0a =
1,ty 2,ty
12 0a =
12a = ( 1,1)k ∈ − ∈ \
12 0a = 12 0a k= ≠
11 0a > 22 0a >
0A
0 1 0, , ,..., 0 2
{ |
p
S S
A c A A AC C gA g≡ = ∈ 11 12 221 22
g g
g g g
⎡ ⎤= ∈⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ . Then the SVAR will be 
identified at arbitrary  ifif  implies . Since the only restriction is 
 this is equivalent to  implies  and . 
However the equation has two pairs of solutions: (  and ) or (
0A 0gA 2Ig =
12 0a k= ≠ 11 12 22g k g a k+ = 11 1g = 12 0g =
11 1g = 12 0g =
2 2
22
2 2
22
11
k a
k a
g −+=  
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and 222 2
22
2
12
ka
k a
g += ). Let  be an orthonormal complement of 1 : (1 2)g⊥ ×
2 2
22 22
2 2 2 2
22 22
2
1 ( ,
k a ka
k a k a
g −+ += )  
i.e.  and . Define 1 1 0g g
⊥ ′ = 1 1 1g g⊥ ⊥′ = 11
g
g g
∗ ⊥⎡ ⎤= ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ . Then provided that , 
 will not be a singleton but comprise two elements:  and 
. Of course when  then 
12 0a k= ≠
0 1, , ,..., p
S
A c A AC 0 1, , ,..., pA c A A
0 1, , ,..., pg A g c g A g A
∗ ∗ ∗ ∗
12 0a k= =
2 2
22 22
2 2 2 2
22 22
2
1 ( , ) ( 1,
k a ka
k a k a
g −+ += = 0)−
t t
tu t
 
and the assumed normalization ,  will exclude this solution. A 
“normalization” in the case  would be much more tricky. Needless to say 
the nature of the problem will reappear also in n dimensional SVAR (for ). 
11 0a > 22 0a >
12 0a k= ≠
− 2n >
 
Although we can list many examples when identifiability holds for almost all 
 (think of coefficients entering model in a multiplicative way like in our 
forthcoming example 4) we shall mention the one from Koop et al. (2011) (which is 
based on Galí at al (2005)) 
2k ∈ Θ
 
Example 3 (identifiability holds for almost all ): 2k ∈ Θ
Consider a Hybrid New Keynesian Phillips Curve (HNKPC): 
1 1 1t b t f t t tE xπ β π β π γ ε− − += + + + ; with  1t tx xρ υ−= +
where  denotes inflation,  the output gap, ,  
(  and  uncorrelated) and  are “intermediate” parameters (i.e. which are 
functions of deep parameters from DSGE model, see Galí at al (2005)). For simplicity 
we consider only the identification of the “intermediate” parameters (though what is 
really interesting is the identifiability of the deep parameters). Under certain 
conditions (see Koop at al. (2011)) the unique solution of HNKPC is  
tπ tx . . .t i i dε ∼ 2(0, )N εσ . . .t i i dυ ∼ 2(0, )N υσ
tε tυ , ,b fβ β γ
1 1 2 1t t txπ α π α− −= + +  together with  1t tx xρ υ−= +
where: 121 (1 1 4 )f f bβα β= − − β 1
)f t
t
,  and 
. Let us denote . The question is: Having 
 can we uniquely retrieve ? A simple counting exercise 
suggests we can not. To identify the model first assume we impose the restriction 
. Noting that ρ  and  can be unambiguously taken from  
(i.e.  and  are identified) and assuming 
2 /(1 ( ))fα γρ β α ρ= − +
1( )/(1t t tu ε γυ α β= + − 2 var( )u uσ =
2 2
1 2, , , ,u υα α ρ σ σ 2 2, , , , ,b f ε υβ β γ ρ σ σ
0b kβ = ≠ 2υσ 1t tx xρ υ−= +
ρ 2υσ 121 (1 1 4 )f f kβα = − − β  has a unique 
solution for fβ  (possibly in the restricted support for fβ ), we can uniquely get all the 
remaining . Hence we identify the model. Now suppose . Then  
which implies α γ  and . Since  and  are free of 
identification problem, ultimately we have two equations , 
2, ,f εβ γ σ 0bβ = 1 0α =
2 /(1 )fρ β ρ= − tt tu ε γυ= + ρ 2υσ
2 /(1 )fα γρ β ρ= −
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2 2 2
u εσ σ γ σ= + 2υ  in three unknowns ,γ fβ , . As a result the model becomes non–
identified. Similar analysis may be conducted by restricting . In the latter case if 
 then the model is identified whereas setting  destroys the 
identification of the remaining parameters. 
2
εσ
γ
0kγ = ≠ 0γ =
 
Evidently examples 2 and 3 suggest that there is a room for the concepts 
weaker than the uniform identifiability. Can the Bayesian contribute to designing 
those weaker notions? We think so. Natural basis for this is the following reasoning. 
In practice we do not consider all restrictions  as equally reasonable. It 
amounts to attaching some weights to possible restrictions. Staying within Bayesian 
framework suppose that we have a marginal (proper) prior measure  on . Since 
we have a prior we must define the relevant identification concept in terms of the 
Bayesian model. How can we incorporate our subjective beliefs about the reasonable 
restrictions for ? As we showed we can not replace the exact restriction  
with the prior  (possibly highly concentrated around ) and conduct the 
Bayesian analysis. In such a case neither  nor  will be identified in the Bayesian 
model. We must look for the other possibility. To this end let us define the integrated 
likelihood as . The idea is that integrating  out from 
the likelihood, the ultimate inference based on an “integrated likelihood” model 
 will take into account our subjective uncertainty about the reasonable 
restrictions for . 
2k ∈ Θ
π 2Θ
2θ 2 kθ =
2( )p θ 2 kθ =
1θ 2θ
2
1 1 2( | ) ( | , ) ( )p y p y dθ θ θΘ= ∫ 2π θ
2π θ
1
2θ
1( | )p y θ
2θ
 
Definition 3: Let  be the marginal (proper) prior measure on . Define 
. The Bayesian model is marginally identified at 
 ifif 
π 2Θ
2
1 1 2( | ) ( | , ) ( )p y p y dθ θ θΘ= ∫
1θ ∈ Θ 1 1θ∀ ∈ Θ  [( 1 1( | ) ( | )p y p yθ = θ  for all y )∈ Y 1 1θ θ⇒ = ]. 
 
Example 1 (cont.): Suppose the parameter  has economic meaning. Instead of 
putting dogmatic restriction , let us assume , where  is fixed 
(  plays the role of  from definition 3). Having one observation y  we get 
. As  tends to 0, the modified 
sampling model  tends to the original sampling model with the exact 
restriction . Since  is fixed (i.e. the prior hyperparameter), it is easy to 
observe that 
2β
2 0β = 22( ) : (0, )Nπ β δ= 2δ
2β 2θ ∈ \
2 2 2
1 1 2 2 1( | , ) ( | , , ) ( ) : ( , )p y p y d Nβ σ β β σ π β β σ δ= =∫ 2δ2+
2
1( | , )p y β σ
2 0β = 2δ
2 2
1 1( | , ) ( | , )p y p yβ σ β σ=  for all y  implies ∈ \ 21 1( , ) ( , )β σ β σ= 2 . Hence 
the modified model is marginally identified. In this example uncertainty concerning 
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the restriction manifests itself in an intuitive way i.e. increasing the variance of the 
disturbance from  in the original sampling model to .  2σ 2 2σ δ+
 
It arises the natural question. What is the relationship between marginal 
identification of the Bayesian model and the standard identification of the sampling 
model ? For reliability of the concept of marginal identification we 
must require that if the sampling model is identified with the help of restriction 
 then the same must be true for this model but marginalized with respect to  
using the prior concentrated around . To achieve this goal we employ the 
following reasoning. Being consistent with intuitive desideratum of early Bayesian 
econometricians we shall assume that if the implicit variance components in  (i.e. a 
prior measure on ) approach zero then the Bayesian “marginal likelihood” model 
becomes the sampling model with exact restrictions (which is identified). To this end 
let us formulate the internal coherence condition (ICC):  
1 2( | , )p y kθ θ =
2 kθ = 2θ
2 kθ =
π
2Θ
 
Assumption (ICC): If  then 2 2( ) ( )n kπ θ δ θ⇒ =
2
1 2 2 1 2( | , ) ( ) ( | , )nF y d F y kθ θ π θ θ θΘ ⇒ =∫  
 
where “ ” denotes weak convergence of distribution functions,  is a 
(degenerated) measure having a single saltus at  and  is the 
distribution function corresponding to . We note that ICC is nothing more 
than the mathematical statement of the opinion expressed by Fisher (1966), p. 184. 
Sufficient condition for ICC is that for all  and all y ;  must be 
continuous at . Needless to say the ICC will be met in standard models. 
⇒ 2( kδ θ = )
1
)
2 2+
2 kθ = 1 2( | , )F y θ θ
1 2( | , )p y θ θ
1θ ∈ Θ ∈ Y 1 2( | , )F y θ θ
1 2, kθ θ =
One caveat is that continuity and identifiability are not the same 
 
Example 4: Let a single observation be y  such that . Clearly if we 
restrict , the sampling model is identified at any . Suppose we take 
the prior . Now it may be shown that 
. Evidently  can not 
identify . Hence the identification is lost in the integrated likelihood. 
∈ \ 2( ,y N αβ σ∼
0kβ = ≠ 2,α σ
( ) : (0,1)Nπ β =
2 2( | , ) ( | , , ) ( ) (0, )p y p y d Nα σ α σ β π β σ α= ≡∫\ 2( | , )p y α σ
2,α σ
 
It should not be surprising that the origin of the possible complications is the fact 
that we center the prior on the parameter value at which a sampling model is non–
identified. For we have 
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Example 4 (cont.): Instead of  let us assume that  with 
. Hence we center the prior on value at which there is no identification problem 
in the sampling model. In such a case 
( ) : (0,1)Nπ β = 2( ) : ( , )N kπ β δ=
0k ≠
2 2( | , ) ( | , , ) ( )p y p y dα σ α σ β π β= ∫\  
. This time everything goes right. As  tends to 0,  weakly 
converges to  and the integrated likelihood  converges to 
, which is the sampling model identified by imposing restriction . 
Hence the ICC is met. Importantly since  are fixed (i.e. hyperparameters of the 
prior), the Bayesian model is marginally identified i.e. 
2 2 2( , )N kα σ α δ≡ + 2δ ( )π β
2( kδ θ = )
)
2( | , )p y α σ
2( ,N kα σ 0kβ = ≠
2,k δ
2 2( | , ) ( | , )p y p yα σ α σ=  for all 
 implies y ∈ \ 2( , ) ( , )α σ α σ= 2
2
) (0, [1 ] [1 ])p y p y Nα α β π β α α′Σ = Σ ≡ Σ+∫\
. Note that prior uncertainty about the “proper” value 
for the restriction  nicely mixes with the sampling model by enlarging sampling 
variability of the latter from  to . 
kβ =
2σ 2 2σ α δ+
 
In fact in example 4 it is sufficient to assume , with , to 
avoid problems exemplified with adoption of . In particular the 
expected value should be a point where the identification holds. The following 
powerful example strengthens this argument since it shows that even if a sampling 
model is identified for almost all parameter values we should be careful not to center 
the prior on the parameter value at which a sampling model is non–identified. 
( ) : ( ,1)N kπ β = 0k ≠
( ) : (0,1)Nπ β =
 
Example 5: Let us generalize example 4 and assume  and , where 
. Clearly if  the sampling model is identified (without any 
restrictions). Let us choose the prior centered on , the parameter point at 
which the model ceased to be identified. Assume e.g. . If we 
marginalize the likelihood with respect to β  using the prior measure  
we get . Hence the 
identification of  is lost in the integrated likelihood. This example is instructive 
since it shows that even if there is no identification problem in the sampling model it 
may show up in the integrated likelihood. The lesson is that we can not judge the 
identification problem on the basis of the marginal posterior behavior. Particularly 
when we do not pay sufficient attention to careful specification of the prior. For 
example, suppose the parameter space is 3–dimensional. Then the visible ridges or 
flat regions in the 2–dimensional marginal posterior need not point to identification 
problems. Needless to say if we employ the measure  (or even ) 
2y ∈ \ ( , )y N μ Σ∼
( , )μ β αβ ′= 0β ≠
0β =
( ) : (0,1)Nπ β =
( ) : (0,1)Nπ β =
( | , ) ( | , , ) (d
,α Σ
2( ) : ( , )N kπ β δ= ( ,1)N k
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with , then the above problems disappear since (using ) we 
obtain .  
0k ≠ 2( ) : ( , )N kπ β δ=
2( | , ) ( [1 ] , [1 ] [1 ])p y N kα α δ α′ ′Σ ≡ Σ+ α
1
 
VII. FAITHFUL IDENTIFICATION 
In this section we study one possible extension to the basic identification 
condition from the Bayesian point of view. As we showed, uniform identifiability is 
not a universal property of many economic models. In particular identifiability almost 
everywhere seems to be characteristic of many economic models. In what follows we 
define a concept of faithful identification of the Bayesian model and uncover its 
relationship with the marginal identification introduced in the previous section. 
 
Definition 4: Let  be the marginal (proper) prior measure on . The Bayesian 
model is faithfully identified at  ifif 
π 2Θ
1θ ∈ Θ 1 1θ∀ ∈ Θ  [( 1 2 1 2( | , ) ( | , )p y k p y kθ θ θ θ= = =  
for all ) a.e. (  implies y ∈ Y )π 1 1θ θ= ]. 
 
Perhaps the main motivation for definition 4 relies on the following reasoning. 
According to definition 4, a Bayesian model is not faithfully identified at  ifif 
there exists at least one 
1θ ∈ Θ1
1θ θ≠ 1 2 1 2( | , ) ( | , )p y k p y kθ θ θ θ= = =1  such that  for all 
possible y  and almost all (  k ’s. Hence whatever sample you may have and for 
almost all restrictions  there will be unsolvable ambiguity concerning whether 
∈ Y )π
2k ∈ Θ
1( , )kθ  or  could generate the sample. On the other hand the relevance of faithful 
identification question may be appreciated if we think of DSGE modeling when some 
parameters are fixed by calibration and the remaining ones are estimated. Then we 
can ask if other calibration would preserve the identification of the model. If a model 
is faithfully identified then almost all calibrations are acceptable in terms of its 
impact on identification of estimated parameters. 
1( , )kθ
To better understand the faithful identifiability let us collect its equivalent 
definitions 
 
Lemma 6: The following expressions are equivalent: 
a) ( 1 2 1 2( | , ) ( | , )p y k p y kθ θ θ θ= = =  for all y ) a.e. (  implies ∈ Y )π 1 1θ θ=  
b) 2 1 2 1 2({ | ( | , ) ( | , )k p y k p yπ θ θ θ∈ Θ = = = kθ  for all 1 1}) 1y θ θ∈ = ⇒ =Y  
c) ( 1 2 1 2( | , ) ( | , )p y k p y kθ θ θ θ= = =  a.e. ( ) for all y  implies )π ∈ Y 1 1θ θ=  
d) 2 1 2 1 2({ | ( | , ) ( | , )}) 1k p y k p y kπ θ θ θ θ∈ Θ = = = =  for all 1 1y θ θ∈ ⇒ =Y  
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e) 2 1 2 1 2 k({ | , ( | , ) ( | , )k y p y k p yθ θ θ∈ Θ ∃ ∈ = ≠ =Yπ θ 1 1}) 0 θ θ= ⇒ =  
f) 1 1θ θ≠ ⇒  2({ |k yπ ∈ Θ ∃ ∈ Y , 1 2 1 2( | , ) ( | , )}) 0p y k p y kθ θ θ θ= ≠ = >  
g) 1 1θ θ≠ ⇒  2({ |k yπ ∈ Θ ∀ ∈ Y , 1 2 1 2( | , ) ( | , )}) 1p y k p y kθ θ θ θ= = = <  
Proof: 
b) This is just equivalent mathematical form of a) 
c) We have  
2 1 2 1 21 ({ | ( | , ) ( | , )k p y k p yπ θ θ θ= ∈Θ = = = kθ  for all  })y ∈ =Y
2 1 2 1 2( { | ( | , ) ( | , )})y k p y k p y kπ θ θ θ∈= ∈ Θ = = =∩ Y  θ  
2 1 2 1 2({ | ( | , ) ( | , )})k p y k p y kπ θ θ θ θ≤ ∈ Θ = = =   
thus 2 1 2 1 2({ | ( | , ) ( | , )}) 1k p y k p y kπ θ θ θ θ∈ Θ = = = =   for arbitrary y , hence for 
every . But 
∈ Y
y ∈ Y 2 1 2 1 2({ | ( | , ) ( | , )}) 1k p y k p y kπ θ θ θ θ∈ Θ = = = =   for all y  is 
equivalent to (
∈ Y
1 2 1 2( | , ) ( | , )p y k p y kθ θ θ θ= = =  a.e. ( ) for all y . )π ∈ Y
d) This is just equivalent mathematical form of c) 
e) 2 1 2 1 2({ | ( | , ) ( | , )k p y k p yπ θ θ θ∈ Θ = = = kθ  for all  ⇔  }) 1y ∈ =Y
0 = 2 1 2 1 21 ({ | ( | , ) ( | , )k p y k p yπ θ θ θ− ∈Θ = = = kθ  for all  })y ∈ =Y
2 1 2 1 2({ | , ( | , ) ( | , )})k y p y k p y kπ θ θ θ= ∈Θ ∃ ∈ = ≠ =Y θ  
f) Take the contrapositive of e) 
g) 2 1 2 1 2({ | , ( | , ) ( | , )}) 0k y p y k p y kπ θ θ θ θ∈ Θ ∃ ∈ = ≠ = >Y ⇔  
2 1 2 1 21 1 ({ | , ( | , ) ( | , )})k y p y k p y kπ θ θ θ θ> − ∈Θ ∃ ∈ = ≠ = =Y  
2 1 2 1 2({ | ( | , ) ( | , )k p y k p yπ θ θ θ= ∈Θ = = = kθ
1
 for all  })y ∈ Y
 
Definitions based on f) and g) are particularly useful for interpretation. Standard 
identification says that the sampling model is identified at  (given the 
restriction ) ifif 
1θ ∈ Θ
2 kθ = 1 1θ∀ ∈ Θ  [ 1 1 yθ θ≠ ⇒ ∃ ∈ Y , 1 2 1 2( | , ) ( | , )p y k p y kθ θ θ θ= ≠ = ]. 
Exploiting the fact that we apply the Bayesian inference we can attach the weighting 
function expressing our belief concerning the most probable restrictions for  (i.e. 
the marginal prior measure ). Then we can ask if the standard identification holds 
for non–negligible set (i.e. of strictly positive π  measure) in . If the answer is in 
the affirmative then the Bayesian model is faithfully identified. On the other hand 
standard identification condition states that the sampling model is 
2θ
π
2Θ
not identified at 
 (given the restriction ) ifif 1θ ∈ Θ1 θ =2 k 1θ∃ ∈ Θ1  [ 1 1θ≠θ   and 
1 2 1 2( | , ) ( | , )p y k p y kθ θ θ θ= = =  for all y ]. But (on the basis of g)) the model is ∈ Y
not faithfully identified at  ifif 1θ ∈ Θ1 1θ∃ ∈ Θ1  [ 1θ θ≠ 1  and 
2 1 2 1 2({ | ( | , ) ( | , )k p y k p y kπ θ θ θ θ∈ Θ = = =  for all ]. The intuition of the }) 1y ∈ =Y
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latter in the context of standard non–identification condition (given the restriction 
) is self–explaining. 2 kθ =
The next proposition gives the sufficient condition for faithful identifiability 
and is useful since it shows that all we have to check is the usual identifiability in 
terms of the integrated likelihood. 
 
Proposition 1: If the Bayesian model is marginally identified at  then it is faithfully 
identified at . 
1θ
1θ
Proof: Using formulation from lemma 6 c) 
1 1 1 2 1 2{ | ( ( | , ) ( | , )p y k p y kθ θ θ θ θ∈ Θ = = =  a.e. ( )  for all y } )π ∈ Y
2 2
1 1 1 2 2 1 2{ | ( | , ) ( ) ( | , ) ( )p y d p y dθ θ θ π θ θ θ π θΘ Θ⊆ ∈ Θ =∫ ∫ 2  for all y } ∈ Y
1 1 1{ | ( | ) ( |p y p yθ θ= ∈Θ = 1)θ
)
 for all y }  ∈ Y 1{ }θ=
where the last equality sign is by the hypothesis of proposition. 
 
The converse of proposition 1 need not hold for we have the following 
 
Example 4 (cont.): Recall that y  and . Suppose we take the prior 
. One way to demonstrate that the Bayesian model is faithfully 
identified at  is to use definition from lemma 6 g). Let 
∈ \ 2( ,y N αβ σ∼
( ) : (0,1)Nπ β =
2( , )α σ 2 2( , ) ( , )α σ α σ≠  and 
note that  
2 2({ | , ( | , , ) ( | , , )})k y p y k p y kπ α σ β α σ∈ ∀ ∈ = = =\ Y β
2 2({ | ( | , , ) ( | , , ) })k yp y k dy yp y k dyπ α σ β α σ β≤ ∈ = = =∫ ∫\ Y Y  
({ | })k kπ α α= ∈ =\ k  
We have: 2( , ) ( , )α σ α σ≠ 2  implies ({ | }) 0k k kπ α α∈ =\ =  implies  
2 2({ | , ( | , , ) ( | , , )}) 0 1k y p y k p y kπ α σ β α σ β∈ ∀ ∈ = = = = <\ Y  
i.e. faithful identifiability. On the other hand it may be shown that 
. Evidently the integrated 
likelihood  can not identify . 
2 2( | , ) ( | , , ) ( ) (0, )p y p y d Nα σ α σ β π β σ α= ≡∫\ 2 2+
2( | , )p y α σ 2,α σ
 
Proposition 2: If the sampling model is uniformly identified at  then the Bayesian 
model is faithfully identified at . 
1θ
1θ
Proof: 
2k∀ ∈ Θ  [ 1 1θ θ≠ ⇒  y∃ ∈ Y , 1 2 1 2( | , ) ( | , )]p y k p y kθ θ θ θ= ≠ =  
ifif 1 1θ θ≠ ⇒  2k∀ ∈ Θ  [ ,y∃ ∈ Y 1 2 1 2( | , ) ( | , )]p y k p y kθ θ θ θ= ≠ =  
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implies 1 1θ θ≠ ⇒  2 1 2 1 2({ | , ( | , ) ( | , )}) 1k y p y k p y kπ θ θ θ θ∈ Θ ∃ ∈ = ≠ = =Y  
implies 1 1θ θ≠ ⇒  2 1 2 1 2({ | , ( | , ) ( | , )}) 0k y p y k p y kπ θ θ θ θ∈ Θ ∃ ∈ = ≠ = >Y  
it follows that  
1 1θ∀ ∈ Θ ,  [2k∀ ∈ Θ 1 1θ θ≠ ⇒  1 2 1 2, ( | , ) ( | , )]y p y k p y kθ θ θ θ∃ ∈ = ≠ =Y  implies 
1 1θ∀ ∈ Θ  [ 1 1θ θ≠ ⇒  2 1 2 1 2({ | , ( | , ) ( | , )}) 0k y p y k p y kπ θ θ θ θ∈ Θ ∃ ∈ = ≠ = >Y ] 
By lemma 6 the latter is equivalent to  
1 1θ∀ ∈ Θ  [( 1 2 1 2( | , ) ( | , )p y k p y kθ θ θ θ= = =  for all y ) a.e. (  implies ∈ Y )π 1 1θ θ= ] 
which proves the proposition. 
 
Thus either uniform or marginal identification implies faithful identification. 
Unfortunately we could not establish any relationship between uniform and marginal 
identification. 
 
VIII. APPLICATION: SVAR AND MARGINAL IDENTIFICATION 
 In this section we provide one possible application of the marginal 
identification in the context of the Structural VAR (SVAR) model. We consider the 
following SVAR 
 
0 1 1 2 2t t t p t pA y Ay Ay A y c ε− − −= + + + + +" t
)t ty Nε − …∼
m
;  .  (8) 1, ,t T= …
 
where ,  is nonsingular,  for ,  
is a vector of constants and . 
1m
ty
×∈ \ 0 : ( )A m m× : ( )iA m m× 1, ,i p= … 1mc ×∈ \
1| , (0, Im
 Let us think about validity of the assumption co . The ready defense 
is that it follows from the fact that SVAR methodology interprets the disturbances as 
being structural (with economic content). Indeed the nature of structural shocks in 
SVAR is well captured by Sims and Zha (2006) who express their attitude to the 
disturbances covariance matrix as follows: “We assume that all structural 
disturbances are mutually uncorrelated. While this goes against the traditional 
simultaneous equations specification, it seems natural and avoids some conceptual 
conundrums … Our view is that a good multiple–equation model should not leave 
unexplained relations among variables in the error terms … we believe that what 
requires explicit discussion and economic interpretation is the presence of correlations 
among structural disturbances, not its absence”. More elaborating discussion on this 
point appears in Leeper et al. (1996). It should be mentioned that the above 
v( ) Itε =
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interpretation is in striking contrast to the classical interpretation of disturbances in 
SEM. Hence SVAR is not just the SEM with identity covariance matrix. 
 However calling disturbances “structural” is fully justified if and only if those 
disturbances are exactly the shocks that appear in economic model (e.g. DSGE). This 
will not be in general true. There are (at least) two sources of complications 1) Ad–
hoc (as measured by modern standards imposed by the DSGE methodology) 
identifying restrictions in SVAR and 2) non–existence of the SVAR representation 
and the problem of lag truncation. We argue that interpretation of structural shocks 
in SVAR is unclear and blurred. 
As for 1) one should be aware that economic models rarely induce any “zeros” 
for the parameters of SVAR models6. But excluding identifying restrictions, mostly 
confined to , are the most popular ones in SVAR modeling. One may say that 
theoretical models of the economy do not provide enough excluding restrictions in 
order to identify the underlying structural shocks within SVAR methodology. Since 
the “true” contemporaneous relations contain more variables that are allowed to be 
estimated within SVAR model (due to identification problems), researchers are forced 
to exclude more variables than in fact comprise these relations. Consequently, the 
omission of some variables from contemporaneous relations makes the bias problem 
for those that are included. This happens because the included and inappropriately 
excluded variables are often correlated. Hence omission of relevant variables in the 
contemporaneous relations may be a source of residuals serial correlation – see also 
Liu (1960). Moreover Cooley and LeRoy (1985) argued that since (just) identifying 
schemes are untestable, one can not be sure whether structural shocks identified 
(orthogonalized) by one particular identifying scheme are really exogenous (primitive) 
shocks. If they are not, the derived structural shocks are in fact a combination of the 
real exogenous shocks. For example, what we broadly identify as private sector shock 
may be in fact a combination of the taste and the technology shock. On this point see 
also Cooley and Dwyer (1998). 
0A
 Concerning 2), as is known, the log–linear approximations to virtually all 
DSGE models may be put in the vector ARMA framework. Since VAR econometrics 
implicitly assume that such a VARMA model has invertible MA component, the 
question whether VAR modeling properly identifies the structural shocks arises quite 
                                                 
6 Lucas and Stokey (1987) “… with specific parameterization of preferences the theory would place many 
restrictions on the behavior of endogenous variables. But these predictions do not take the form of locating blocks 
of zeros in a VAR description of these variables”. 
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naturally. Hansen and Sargent (1991) looking at some specific economic models noted 
that the condition for invertibility of MA component “fails to be met” for a class of 
models that “is not thin in any natural sense”. If this is the case they showed that 
VAR analysis works very poorly e.g. leads to completely distorted impulse responses 
which are very different from theoretical (economic model’s) impulse responses. See 
also Fernández–Villaverde et al. (2005). On the other hand, under certain conditions 
log–linear approximations to some general class of DSGE models may be cast in the 
infinite order SVAR model, see e.g. Christiano et al. (2006), Fernández–Villaverde et 
al. (2005). Note however that the matrix of contemporaneous relations i.e. , will be 
then, in general, a very nonlinear function of deep economic parameters that usually 
do not induce any excluding restrictions on this matrix, as motivated in point 1). 
Anyway, even if SVAR( ) representation is valid we must truncate the lags to 
make inference feasible. This will necessarily introduce a portion of cross–correlation 
into “structural” disturbances in your finite order SVAR. More complete discussion 
relevant to 2) is available in Ravenna (2007). 
0A
∞
 The above critique of the assumption  logically hinges on the 
methodological stance that for the time–series model to be valid it must be consistent 
with theoretical model. Although we can not philosophically object to the reverse 
reasoning, we think that even proponents of the latter view do not treat the 
assumption  as literally true but only as a useful approximation. In 
particular see Leeper and Zha (2002) for specific calculations of correlations between 
structural shocks that suggest  (at best). In what follows we apply the 
marginal identification concept in the context of the restriction co .  
cov( ) Itε = m
m
m
× +
= … 1 2[ ]T
m T
y y y y
×
= …
1
2
p
m
cov( ) Itε =
cov( ) Itε ≈
v( ) It mε =
 To this end we must introduce additional notation. Let 
,  and  1 2( 1)
[ ]pm mp
B A A A c
0 1
1 0
( 1)
1 2
1 1 1
T
T
mp T
p p T
y y y
y y y
X
y y y
−
− −
+ × − + − + −
⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥′ ⎢ ⎥= ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
"
"
# # % #
"
"
 
The original SVAR imposes co . Suppose for a moment that 
7
v( ) Itε =
cov( ) 0tε = Ω> . Then the data sampling density would read 
 
11
22 11
20 0 0( | , , , ) (2 ) det( ) etr{ ( )( ) }
T TmTp y A B X A A y BX A y BXπ −− − ′Ω = Ω − Ω − −0 ′ ′
                                                
 (9) 
 
7 For any square symmetric matrix X ,  signifies that  is positive definite. 0X > X
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where  and  is the matrix trace operator. Of course putting 
 we arrive at the likelihood corresponding to (8) 
{ }etr{} tre ⋅⋅ ≡ {}tr ⋅
cov( ) Itε = m
 
1
2 1
20 0 0( | , , I , ) (2 ) det( ) etr{ ( )( ) }
TmT
mp y A B X A A y BX A y BXπ − ′Ω = = − − −0 ′ ′
Ω =
 (10) 
 
Anyway being consistent with our earlier notation let  and . Our 
goal is to introduce the marginal prior measure for  and use the latter to 
integrate  out from the likelihood (9). For the ease of exposition it is useful to 
assume inverted Wishart distribution for . In particular using the notation from 
Zellner (1971), p. 395, we take . The 
parameters of  were chosen so as  (provided that ). Then it 
is easy to show 
1 0( , )A Bθ = 2θ = Ω
2θ = Ω
Ω
Ω
2( ) ( ) (( 1) I , , )mIW m mπ θ π ν ν≡ Ω = − − ⋅
( )π Ω ( ) ImE Ω = 1mν > +
 
0 0
0
( | , , ) ( | , , , ) ( )p y A B X p y A B X dπ
Ω>
= Ω∫
1 1
2 211 1
2 21
( )[ ( )] | | ( 1)
mmT T mTT i i
i
mν νπ− −−+ + − + −== Γ Γ ⋅ Σ − −∏ 12ν ⋅     (11) 
1
2( )1
1| I ( ) ( )( ) |
T
mT y X y X
ν
ν
− +
− −′ ′ ′⋅ + −Π Σ −Π  
 
where  and . Hence  is the pdf of the matricvariate 
Student distribution i.e. 
0 0A A′Σ = 10A B−Π = 0( | , , )p y A B X
1
10( | , , ) ( | , I , , )
m T
mMt Tp y A B X f y X T mν ν× − −′= Π Σ + −  (notation 
taken from Drèze and Richard (1983)). Now since as  the prior  becomes 
degenerated at  we will check if the ICC holds. To this end note that  
ν →∞ ( )π Ω
ImΩ =
 
1
2( )1 1
1 2lim | I ( ) ( ) | etr{ ( ) ( )
T
mT y X y X y X y X
ν
νν
− +
− −→∞
′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′+ −Π Σ −Π = − −Π Σ −Π =}
1
2 0 0etr{ ( )( ) }A y BX A y BX′ ′ ′= − − −        (12) 
 
1 1
2 211 1
2 21
lim( 1) ( )[ ( )] 2
mmT mTT i i
i
m ν ν
ν
ν − −+ + − + −=→∞ − − Γ Γ =∏ −      (13) 
 
Hence as ν ,  converges to  i.e. the ICC 
holds. Moreover since we center the prior  on  (i.e. a point at which the usual 
identification theory for the model (10) works) we should not expect any problems 
(as indicated in example 4). Indeed we can easily demonstrate  
→∞ 0( | , , )p y A B X 0( | , , I , )mp y A B XΩ =
( )π Ω Im
 
Proposition 3: Define , , 0 0A A′Σ = 10A B−Π = 0 0A A′Σ = , 10A B−Π = . Provided that X  
has full row rank we obtain: 
′
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1 1
1 1( | , I , , ) ( | , I , , )
m T m T
m mMt T Mt Tf y X T m f y X T mν νν ν× ×− − − −′ ′Π Σ + − = Π Σ + −  for all 
 implies (m Ty ×∈ \ 0A HA= 0  and B HB= ), where  is any orthogonal 
matrix i.e. . 
: ( )H m m×
ImHH H H′ ′= =
Proof: 1 11 1( | , I , , ) ( | , I , , )
m T m T
m mMt T Mt Tf y X T m f y X T mν νν ν× ×− − − −′ ′Π Σ + − = Π Σ + −  
for all  implies that expected values of these densities are the same hence: m Ty ×∈ \
1 1
0 0 0 0( | , , ) ( | , , )E y A B X A BX A BX E y A B X
− −′ ′= = = . Provided that X  is full row 
rank it possesses the right inverse hence 
′
1 1
0 0A BX A BX
− −′ = ′  implies 1 10 0A B A B− −= . 
Moreover the hypothesis of the proposition implies that the covariance matrices of 
the two matricvariate Student pdf’s are also the same i.e. 
1 1 1
0 0cov( ( ) | , , ) I I cov( ( ) | , , )T Tvec y A B X vec y A B X
− − −= ⊗Σ = ⊗Σ = ⇔ Σ = Σ 1−  hence 
1 1 1
0 0 0 0A A A A
− − − −′ = 1′ . By Vinograd’s theorem 1 1 10 0 0 0A A A A− − − −′ ′= 1  ifif 1 10 0A A− −= H  ifif 
0A H A′= 0  for some orthogonal  matrix. Inserting : ( )H m m× 0A H A′= 0  into 
1
0 0A B A B
− −= 1  we get 1 10 0A B A HB− −=  ifif B HB=  ifif B H B′= . 
 
Proposition 3 states that equivalence class of the sampling model 
 is the same as the equivalence class of the marginal (Bayesian) 
model . Hence all results on identification 
given in Rubio–Ramírez et al (2010) in the context of  are also 
valid for the marginal model. 
0( | , , I , )mp y A B XΩ =
0 0
0
( | , , ) ( | , , , ) ( )p y A B X p y A B X dπ
Ω>
= Ω∫ Ω
0
+ −
0( | , , I , )mp y A B XΩ =
As a final remark we note that Bayesian inference on marginal model may be 
easily conducted. In particular using a joint flat prior for  we can decompose the 
posterior as 
0,A B
 
0 0( , | , ) ( | , , ) ( | , )p A B X y p B A X y p A X y=      (14) 
 
in which:  
 
( 1) 1 1 1
0 0 0 0( | , , ) ( | ( ) ,( ) ,(( 1) I ) , )
m mp
Mt mp B A X y f B A yX X X X X m AQA T mν ν× + − − −′ ′ ′= − − ⋅ +
 
0( | , )p A X y ∝ 1 12 2( 10 0 0 0| | | I |T TmAQ A AQ A ν− + − −∗ ∗′ ′+ )mp
′
 
 
where  and 1[I ( ) ]TQ y X X X X y
−′ ′= − 1 1mQ Qν∗ − −= . 
 27
Since the factorization (14) was derived under a flat prior, the question about 
existence of the posterior is highly relevant. The following lemma will be instrumental 
in answering this question 
 
Lemma 7:  
1 1
2 2( 1)
0 0 0 0 0| | | I | (m m
T T mp
mAQ A AQ A dA
ν
×
− + − −∗ ∗′ ′+ =∫\ )  
= 21 12 2 1 11 12 2 2 2| | [ ( )] ( ) ( )[ ( )]m m mp m T mpT mmm m m mQ ν νπ− − − − + − −∗ − +Γ Γ Γ Γ −  
where  is the multivariate gamma function defined as ()mΓ ⋅
1
4 ( 1) 1
21
( ) ( )
mm m i
m i
a aπ − −=Γ = Γ −∏ . 
Proof: If  (i.e. (  is of full column rank) then 
 is positive definite and we may decompose Q , where R  is lower 
triangular. Changing variables as  with the Jacobian J A  
we get 
( )rank y X m mp′ = + +# 1 )
X→ =
y X′#
Q∗ RR∗ ′=
0X A R= 0( ) | | mR −
1 1
2 2( 1)
0 0 0 0 0| | | I | (m m
T T mp
mAQ A AQ A dA
ν
×
− + − −∗ ∗′ ′+∫\ )  
=
1 1
2 2( 1)| | | | | I | ( )
m m
T T mpm
mR XX XX dX
ν
×
− + − −− ′ ′+ =∫\  
=
21 1 1
2 2 2( 1) ( 1)1
2
0
| | [ ( )] | | | I | (m T T mm mm m
W
R W W νπ − − + − −− −
>
Γ +∫ )p dW  
where the last equality follows by Hsu’s lemma (see e.g. theorem 1.4.10. in Gupta and 
Nagar (2000)). But the integrand is the kernel of matricvariate beta type II pdf (see 
e.g. Gupta and Nagar (2000) p. 166). Hence the integrating constant of the integral 
(with respect to W ) is readily available. Multiplying all the constant terms and 
noting | | =mR −
1
2|  we arrive at  | mQ −∗
1 1
2 2( 1)
0 0 0 0 0| | | I | (m m
T T mp
mAQ A AQ A dA
ν
×
− + − −∗ ∗′ ′+∫\ )  
= 21 12 2 1 11 12 2 2 2| | [ ( )] ( ) ( )[ ( )]m m mp m T mpT mmm m m mQ ν νπ− − − − + − −∗ − +Γ Γ Γ Γ −
)
. 
 
Clearly for the existence of  we need all arguments of multivariate gamma 
functions to be greater than 
0( | ,p A X y
1
2
m−  (i.e. the integrating constant derived in lemma 7 is 
well defined). In particular 1 12
mp m mν− − − −> 2
                                                
 is the most stringent which amounts to 
. Hence the latter is the condition for existence of the joint posterior 
under the joint flat prior for 8
2mp mν > +
0,A B  in the marginal model.  
 
+
+
8 More precisely the condition  is necessary and sufficient for existence of the posterior of a sampling 
model without any identifying restrictions i.e. posterior with the support . Note however 
that with any other support being a subset  (induced by identifying restrictions) the condition 
 is still sufficient for existence of the posterior defined on this subset. 
2mp mν > +
( 1)
0( , )
m m m mpA B × ×∈ ×\ \
( 1)m m m mp× ××\ \
2mp mν > +
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Of course to use in practice the Bayesian inference based on the “integrated 
likelihood” model we should provide identifying restrictions. This will require a design 
of the efficient sampling methods to draw from , which is however beyond 
the scope of the present paper. 
0( | ,p A X y)
 
IX. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 We provided (hopefully) a fresh clarifying view on identification problem seen 
from Bayesian perspective. Although most results concerning the core of Bayesian 
identification presented in the paper seem to be trivial their interpretations suggest 
that they constitute a proper basis for discussing the identification problem. One 
major message is that relationship between the prior and the posterior for the given 
data is silent about identification of Bayesian or sampling model. What is important 
is how this relationship behaves when alternative samples are available. Moreover the 
hope that inexact (probabilistic) restrictions laid out within Bayesian approach could 
replace exact restrictions should be abandoned. Probabilistic restriction can not 
identify either sampling or Bayesian model. 
We discussed three concepts: uniform, marginal and faithful identification. We 
think that the concept of marginal identification is the most important. First, it 
implies faithful identification. Second, it constitutes a Bayesian contribution to the 
general concept of identification. Something which does not have any counterpart in 
non–Bayesian framework. However in practice the use of marginal identification may 
be a challenge. In particular integrating out “uncertain” restrictions from the model 
may not be analytically attainable. That is it may entail numerical integration. For 
example we can not analytically integrate out parameters comprising 
contemporaneous relations in SVAR (though this seems to be the most natural 
application of marginal identification in the context of SVAR). However this may not 
be considered as a serious obstacle in a world where Monte Carlo methods became 
the synonym of applied Bayesian analysis. As a potential interesting application of 
the marginal identification we should mention the DSGE modeling. In particular if 
one is uncertain about sensible calibration of a group of deep parameters we can just 
integrate them out from a model. Then such a prepared “integrated likelihood” model 
will be subject to the usual Bayesian inference. 
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